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FOREWORD
The Middle East is facing a period of great instability and uncertainty. The region is beset with civil
wars, sectarian conflicts between Sunnis and Shias,
the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
and its competition with al-Qaeda, and conflicts between countries and factions opposing and supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and like-minded Islamist
groups. The question arises as to whether an Arab regional order can be found amidst these conflicts and,
if so, what types of opportunities and challenges does
it pose for U.S. interests and policies in the region?
Middle East expert Gregory Aftandilian, the author of this monograph, argues that there is, indeed,
a new Arab regional order, but it is essentially two
orders: one has arisen in the wake of the tumult in
the so-called Arab Spring countries, which has led to
conflicts between Islamist political organizations and
their opponents; the other is a result of the Houthi
takeover of large parts of Yemen, which has exacerbated Sunni-Shia tensions in the region.
Saudi Arabia has emerged as a leader of both the
anti-Islamist alliance—supporting the government of
Egypt, for example, since the ouster of the Muslim
Brotherhood government in 2013—and of the antiShia alliance, which is marshalling a number of Arab
states to aid Saudi military efforts in the campaign
against the Houthis. The author indicates that, while
these alliances present opportunities for the United
States on one level, particularly because they include
many long-standing U.S. friends in the region, they
also present challenges for the United States on another level. These challenges include the danger of being
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perceived as taking sides in sectarian conflicts as well
as in internal political disputes between secular and
Islamist political factions.
Mr. Aftandilian cogently analyzes these alliances
in the Arab world and offers specific policy recommendations that would serve U.S. interests in the
region. The Strategic Studies Institute hopes the findings of this monograph will be of assistance to U.S.
policymakers and U.S. Army officers as they deal with
this important region of the world.
			

			
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
			Director
			
Strategic Studies Institute and
			
U.S. Army War College Press
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SUMMARY
Gregory Aftandilian examines the new Arab regional order that has emerged in recent years and
analyzes opportunities and challenges for U.S. interests in the region as a result of this order. He argues
that the new order encompasses two main alliances.
The first is an anti-Islamist grouping of countries and
factions opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood and likeminded Islamist groups. This alliance emerged in the
aftermath of the ouster of Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait
showered the new Egyptian government with billions of dollars in aid because they saw the Brotherhood as a threat. This alliance has expanded to include
secular elements in Tunisia and Libya, as well as the
Jordanian government.
The second alliance is an anti-Shia grouping that
came about in the aftermath of the Houthi (a Yemeni Shia group) takeover of the Yemeni government
and large swaths of Yemeni territory. In March 2015,
Saudi Arabia was able to muster the support of many
Arab Sunni countries to support its military campaign
against the Houthis. These alliances, because they are
led by and made up of long-standing U.S. friends in
the region, may benefit U.S. interests on one level, but
they also present challenges to U.S. policy on another.
For example, if the anti-Islamist grouping redirects
its attention to the fight against the Islamic State in
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which is, to some extent,
already underway, that will be a positive development. But if this alliance continues to repress nonviolent Islamist groups, it puts the United States in the
awkward position of being perceived as playing sides
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in these countries’ internal politics. As for supporting
the anti-Shia alliance, the policy puts Iran on notice
not to interfere in countries like Yemen, but it has the
potential to harm U.S. relations with the Iraqi government, hinder the possibility of a new relationship with
Iran if Tehran moderates its policies, and make U.S.
human rights policy problematic if the United States
is perceived as anti-Shia.
Aftandilian argues that U.S. policymakers should
continue to promote inclusivity of all nonviolent
political groups in political systems of the regional
countries regardless of whether they are secularist or
Islamist, with the understanding that there are limits
to U.S. influence in this realm. In addition, U.S. policymakers should continue to avoid taking sides as
much as possible in Sunni-Shia conflicts and should
use their influence with various countries to dampen
such conflicts, as they are a main source of instability
in the region and help extremist groups such as ISIL
and al-Qaeda exploit these conflicts. He also recommends that the U.S. Army should assist countries in
the region in counterterrorism training and operations where possible, but that Army personnel should
avoid being drawn into discussions or debates about
the Islamist-secularist and Sunni-Shia conflicts.
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THE NEW ARAB REGIONAL ORDER:
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES
FOR U.S. POLICY
Since the 1940s, the Arab world has witnessed
many groupings or alliances. Some have been ideologically driven; others have been based on shared interests, sometimes in opposition to a particular regional
or world power. These groupings or alliances have
usually been led by a dominant Arab state, though
often it has been opposed by its share of detractors.
Outside powers have also tried to shape or affect these
alliances, but with mixed results.
There is not one Arab regional order as of 2015,
but at least two. They have arisen in part due to the
tumultuous events in the region over the past several
years—including the Iraq War, the rise of Iranian influence in the region, and the Arab Spring. The latter
shook the underpinnings of state power in the region
and led to the ouster or resignation of several authoritarian leaders, namely Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Muammar Qadhafi of
Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh of Yemen. The rulers of
several other countries managed to hold on to power
after the countries experienced a period of unrest, but,
with the exception of Tunisia, democracy has not replaced the authoritarian systems in these countries.
Instead, authoritarianism has returned to Egypt, while
Libya, Syria, and Yemen are embroiled in civil war.
The two Arab regional orders today are: 1) an
anti-Islamist grouping; and 2) an anti-Shia grouping that solidified in reaction to the Houthi takeover
of Yemen’s capital of Sana in March 2015, but which
extends beyond Yemen to include several Arab countries in which a Sunni-Shia conflict is apparent.
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That Iran took advantage of the Iraq War of 2003
to extend its influence among the Shia of Iraq and offer ongoing assistance to various Shia groups in the
region has made the anti-Shia grouping of Arab states
all the more anxious.
Saudi Arabia has become the dominant player in
these two regional orders for the following reasons:
a) With Egypt having turned inward to deal with
domestic upheavals since 2011, Saudi Arabia filled a
regional leadership vacuum;
b) It came to oppose the Muslim Brotherhood, seeing it as a threat not only to Egypt but to stability in
the Gulf region as well;
c) Saudi Arabia saw its northern neighbor, Iran,
use unrest in the region—particularly in states like
Iraq, Syria, and Yemen with significant Shia populations—as a way to extend its influence, participating
in so-called proxy wars;
d) Saudi Arabia’s large oil revenues have enabled
it to exercise influence in the region, particularly in
aiding Sunni states and Sunni elements; and,
e) Its new king seems to believe that the United
States is either growing wary of engagement with the
Arab world or is hedging its bets on a new relationship with Iran, compelling Saudi Arabia to exercise
more forceful leadership in the region.1
Because Saudi Arabia has been a long-standing ally
of the United States, some U.S. policymakers may see
this more active and forceful Saudi role in the region
as a positive development. After all, the two countries
have had a close economic and security relationship
since the 1940s, and the United States came to the aid
of Saudi Arabia in the 1990-91 Gulf War, when Iraqi
forces were at Saudi Arabia’s doorstep.
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While there are certainly some positive aspects for
the United States from these Saudi-dominated regional groupings, there are also some negative aspects,
because the United States and Saudi Arabia (and its
allies) do not always see eye-to-eye on regional developments. This monograph analyzes these developments and informs U.S. policymakers about ways
in which the new Arab regional orders present both
opportunities and challenges for the United States.
HISTORY OF THE ARAB REGIONAL ORDER
For a time after World War II, the Arab world was
fixated on the idea of unity, perhaps out of a sense that
the imperial powers, namely Britain and France, had
robbed them of this dream at the end of World War
I. As one prominent scholar of the period has noted:
“Ever since the second world war, popular political
sentiments in the Arab world have been dominated
by urgent appeals for Arab unity, while the field of
activity between governments and parties has been
dominated by bitter rivalry.”2
Even before the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser as
Egyptian (and later Arab nationalist) leader, Egypt
saw its main competitor in the region as Iraq, which
was supported by Jordan, its fellow Hashemite regime to its west. To counter this Iraq-Jordan alliance,
Egypt created a regional bloc encompassing Saudi
Arabia and Syria. This was often called the “Triangle
Alliance.”3 Prior to the 1958 coup in Iraq, which overthrew the monarchy, Iraq and Jordan were perceived
as British client states. When the British created the
so-called Baghdad Pact in 1955—which encompassed
Britain, Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan and was indirectly supported by the United States—Egypt under
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Nasser took the lead in mounting Arab opposition to
it. Although Saudi Arabia had close ties to the United
States and supported it in the global Cold War, it sided with Egypt in this case because of its antipathy to
Iraq and Jordan. Tribal factors may have played a role
as well. The founder of the Saudi state, Abdel Aziz
Ibn Saud, in the 1920s, had forced the Hashemites out
of the Hejaz region of the Arabian Peninsula, which
included the Muslim holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
The Saudis suspected that the Hashemites still had
their hearts set on winning that region back some day.
The 1956 Suez War, launched against Egypt by
Britain, France, and Israel in the wake of Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, propelled
Nasser into becoming a pan-Arab nationalist hero and
leader. With the help of the United States, which was
angered that three of its allies had conspired to invade
Egypt, especially at a time when the Soviet Union was
sending tanks into Hungary to crush an anti-communist rebellion, Nasser was able to turn a military defeat
into a diplomatic victory when these forces withdrew
from Egypt. From 1956 to 1967, Egypt was the undisputed leader of the Arab world. Nasserist movements
and political parties emerged in many Arab capitals,
and millions of Arabs listened to Nasser’s speeches on
the radio.
In 1958, with Syria in the midst of political uncertainty, a group of prominent Syrian Baathists (whose
ideology was similar to Nasserism) flew to Cairo to
urge a union between Egypt and Syria. Although
scholars of this period have noted that Nasser initially
was hesitant about the offer, he could not, as the preeminent pan-Arab leader, turn down the Baathists’
request. Thus, the United Arab Republic (UAR) was
born in 1958. That same year, it looked like the UAR
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would be able to expand eastward in the aftermath
of the 1958 military coup in Iraq, which overthrew
the Hashemite monarchy and established a republic
under another army colonel, Abdel Karim al-Qasim.
However, after an initial flirtation, Nasser and Qasim
became bitter enemies despite the outward similarities in their backgrounds. Perhaps it was the age-old
rivalry between Cairo and Baghdad that doomed the
“romance,” and the fact that Qasim did not want to be
under Nasser’s thumb. In any event, Cairo was soon
denouncing Qasim as a stooge of the Communists,
who were indeed allies of Qasim against the Iraqi
Baathists and Nasserists. As for the union between
Egypt and Syria, it came to an end in 1961 when a
group of Syrian military officers, with the support
of certain conservative politicians, staged a coup in
Damascus and sent the Egyptians home.4
Although these events illustrated that Nasser
certainly had his share of detractors, he nonetheless
continued to set the agenda in Arab affairs. In the
aftermath of the breakup of the UAR, Nasser turned
leftward in domestic and regional affairs. At home,
he issued a number of socialist decrees that led to the
widespread nationalization of industry. In the wider
region, he decided to come to the aid of the Yemeni
republican forces in 1962 after they staged a coup
against the Yemeni monarchy, which led to a civil war
in that country. These developments set the stage for
a proxy war in the region, as Saudi Arabia, fearing the
anti-monarchical and radical brand of Arab nationalism that Nasser was espousing, came to the aid of the
Yemeni royalist forces.
Egypt soon became bogged down in Yemen,
expending so much blood and money there—at one
point involving as many as 55,000 Egyptian troops—
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that the conflict was sometimes referred to as “Nasser’s Vietnam.”5 Ironically, 4 decades later, Saudi
Arabia and Egypt are now on the same side in a new
Yemeni civil war. It was only in the aftermath of the
1967 Arab-Israeli war that Nasser was able to extricate
Egyptian forces from Yemen honorably, by claiming
that such forces were needed to confront a “militaristic” Israel, whose forces had captured the entire Sinai
Peninsula in the brief conflict.
The 1967 Arab defeat by Israel (which included
heavy Egyptian losses in territory, soldiers, and military equipment) was a humiliating blow to Nasser
and his brand of pan-Arab nationalism. Although he
stayed on as leader of Egypt until his own death by natural causes 3 years later, he and Egypt never regained
the mantle as preeminent leader of the Arab world.
Nasser even compromised Egypt’s independence by
relying heavily on the Soviet Union for military and
political support. By the late-1960s, there were at least
10,000 Soviet military advisers, whose presence soon
became unpopular, in Egypt.
Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, never had Nasser’s charisma in regional affairs, nor did he aspire to
become a pan-Arab nationalist leader. His foremost
objective, after he consolidated power at home and
removed the threats against him, was to retrieve lost
Egyptian lands from the Israelis. He achieved this
through a combination of war and diplomacy, and
by switching sides in the Cold War. Sadat and Syrian
leader Hafez Assad effectively conspired to embark on
a war against Israel in 1973, which caught the Israelis
off-guard. Sadat knew that he could not defeat the Israelis but reasoned that, if he could achieve some initial
battlefield successes, these could restore Egyptian and
Arab pride. He also hoped to draw in the Americans,
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who would come to the aid of the Israelis. Although
Sadat relied on Soviet airlifts of military supplies during the 1973 War, his goal was to convince the United
States that it had to pressure the Israelis to stop the
fighting and eventually start a peace process. In this
effort, he was able to elicit the support of Saudi Arabia, which led the Arab oil embargo against the United
States in late-1973 and early-1974.6 Through these efforts, Sadat was able to resurrect the Egyptian-SyrianSaudi “Triangle Alliance”; this grouping became the
dominant one in the Arab world in the mid-1970s. The
initial Arab military victories in the 1973 War, plus the
Arab oil boycott—which led to the quadrupling of oil
prices and the growth of Arab economic power—went
a long way in reversing the humiliation of the 1967
defeat and in restoring Arab pride.
But Sadat’s peace process goals, which eventually led to the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the
Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979, also brought
about Egypt’s ostracism in the Arab world soon after, as most Arabs saw these actions as removing
Egypt from the Arab military equation with Israel.
Egypt effectively went on its own, shored up by U.S.
financial largesse. But no one Arab state was able to
fill the leadership vacuum. Although Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, orchestrated the official Arab boycott
of Egypt, it soon became bogged down in a bloody
8-year war with revolutionary Iran, starting in 1980.
Syria, which faced internal strife in the late-1970s and
the early-1980s from the Muslim Brotherhood, decided to side with Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, which took
it out of contention for Arab leadership. As the Arab
Gulf States faced the threat from Iran, they generously
funded Iraq’s war effort when that country’s revenues
started to run out.
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During the 1980s, Egypt, now under the presidency of Hosni Mubarak, slowly re-established relations with most of the Arab states that had broken
diplomatic relations with it earlier. These actions
were assisted by the fact that Egypt also had assisted
Iraq with workers and military advice during the latter half of the Iran-Iraq War. But in 1990, when Iraq
invaded Kuwait and Saddam Hussein sought to become the Arab world’s new strongman, Egypt started
to exercise a leadership role again (in contrast to Iraq).
The Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi alliance re-emerged, as all
three countries feared Saddam Hussein’s ambitions.
Egypt was able to use its diplomatic skills to convince
a majority of states of the Arab League to condemn the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and both Egypt and Syria
sent troops to Saudi Arabia as part of the coalition
forces, led by the United States, arrayed against Iraq.7
In the 1990s, in the wake of this Gulf War, Egypt
attempted to reassert an Arab leadership role by portraying itself as a defender of the Arab nation—criticizing what it called punitive Western action against
the Iraqi people, assisting the Palestinians in negotiations with the Israelis, criticizing Israeli actions in East
Jerusalem and the West Bank, and calling attention to
the Israelis’ purported nuclear arsenal in Egypt’s message that the Middle East should be free of weapons
of mass destruction. Egypt also portrayed itself as the
conduit through which Arab concerns could be passed
on to Washington. Such efforts worked for a time in
bringing more attention to Cairo, though Egypt never
regained the role it had in the late-1950s and the 1960s
as the preeminent Arab state.
The Iraq War of 2003 again shifted attention to
the Arab east. Although Egypt allowed U.S. military
planes and warships to transverse Egyptian airspace
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and the Suez Canal on the way to the Gulf,8 politically,
it believed the war was a mistake. Egypt thought the
war made the United States (and Arab countries that
had close relations with Washington) a liability in the
minds of many Arabs and helped to feed the al-Qaeda
narrative that the United States was at war with Islam.
A few years later, sectarian divisions between Sunnis and Shias started to grow in the region, fueled in
part by the Iraq War, which had replaced a Sunnidominated regime in Baghdad with a Shia one. The
growth of these divisions was also fueled by Hezbollah’s mini-war against the Israelis in the summer of
2006, when Sunni Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi
Arabia initially denounced Hezbollah’s provocations,
only to see their own populations rally to Hezbollah’s
anti-Israel campaign. Meanwhile, Bashar Assad of
Syria denounced Sunni leaders who had been critical
of the Syrian-Hezbollah connection.9
From 2005 to the end of the George W. Bush administration in January 2009, several leading Arab
states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia faced extremists within their own countries—some of whom
were returning fighters from the Iraq conflict—and
a political campaign by the United States pushing a
so-called “Freedom Agenda,” which aimed to democratize countries in the region. Mubarak came under
sustained pressure from Washington for a time, and
made some political concessions, such as agreeing to
multi-candidate presidential elections. But in the end,
he was able to fend off the pressure, effectively using Muslim Brotherhood electoral gains and a Hamas
electoral win next door in the Palestinian territories
to scare off Washington,10 while the Saudis effectively
told the United States that they would pursue political
reform on their own timetable.11
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Then, beginning in 2011, the Arab world began to
experience internal upheavals as a result of the Arab
Spring. Such upheavals led to the removal of several authoritarian leaders, and were supported by the
United States, even though the Barack Obama administration, when it first came to office, did not place democratization in the Middle East as a high priority.
In this environment, Saudi Arabia, which feared the
Arab Spring, became a leader of the conservative status quo, sending troops (along with the United Arab
Emirates [UAE]) to help neighboring Bahrain stave
off demonstrations calling for political change. Saudi
King Abdullah reportedly even had a testy phone call
exchange with Obama, admonishing him for supporting the ouster of Mubarak of Egypt.12
Sunni-Shia divisions also affected Arab politics.
Al-Qaeda seized upon the chaos in Iraq after the
2003 war by taking over disaffected Sunni areas of
the country and helping to foment a sectarian war by
targeting Shias, playing to Sunni fears of Iran. That
many Iraqi Shia factions had close ties with Iran did,
in fact, enable Iran to become a prominent player in
Iraqi politics. This new Shia assertiveness in Iraqi
politics, plus al-Qaeda’s efforts to foment sectarian
strife, exacerbated Sunni-Shia tensions in the region.
Jordan’s King Abdullah, for example, warned in 2004
of a “Shia crescent” in the region. Second, when the
Arab Spring demonstrations in Syria broke out in
2011 and after several months morphed into a civil
war, this conflict took on sectarian dimensions, as the
rebels—comprised predominantly of Sunnis—battled
Assad’s Alawite-dominated regime (the Alawite sect
is a branch of Shia Islam). Iran and Hezbollah both
came to the aid of the Assad regime, while the Saudis
and the Qataris aided the rebels.
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More recent developments have also helped fan
the flames of sectarianism. When the remnants of alQaeda in Iraq moved westward into eastern Syria and
became the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)
and then moved eastward to take over large parts of
Iraq in the summer of 2014, Iraq’s Shia militias, aided
by Iran, were able to help save Baghdad from falling to
ISIL. Many analysts believe that ISIL’s rapid advance
into Iraq was facilitated by Iraqi Sunnis who saw this
extremist group as a lesser evil compared to the Shiadominated Baghdad regime.13
Meanwhile, Egypt has been going through a different kind of political tumult. After Mubarak’s resignation, power in Egypt passed to the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces, then to the Muslim Brotherhood,
and then back to the military under Defense Minister
Abdel Fatah el-Sisi. Libya, after the fall of Qadhafi, has
been awash in militias, most of which are allied with
Libya’s rival governments—an Islamist one in Tripoli
and a secular one in Tobruk. Yemen has also experienced political upheavals, leading to the resignation
of long-time strongman Ali Saleh in 2012. But his vice
president and successor, Abed Rabbu Hadi, was not
successful in consolidating his rule, and faced an insurgency by Houthi rebels, who follow the Zaidi branch
of Shia Islam, from the north. The Houthis took over
the Yemeni capital and other parts of the country in
2015, with the aid of remnants of forces loyal to Saleh.
Suffice to say that the Middle East is now in the midst
of one of its most unstable periods in modern history.
Because Egypt has been consumed with domestic affairs since 2011, and Syria and Iraq are both in
chaos, leadership in the Arab world has now shifted
to Saudi Arabia. With their deep pockets because of
the country’s oil wealth and their more assertive mili-
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tary posture, the Saudis have taken the lead in helping
form at least two of the region’s major alliances. The
Saudis know they cannot achieve what they want by
themselves and have garnered the support of several
countries to advance their agenda. But, as Egypt experienced in the 1950s and 1960s, leadership does not
imply compliance by a country’s allies on all issues.
Overextension, moreover, can become a problem, and
differences can and do arise even among friends. The
following section explains these new alliances.
THE NEW REGIONAL ALLIANCES
AND THEIR DETRACTORS
The Anti-Islamist Alliance.
The political turmoil in Egypt, the Arab world’s
most populous country, was the catalyst that initially
led to a new grouping in that world, which is the antiIslamist alliance. This alliance cannot be described
as strictly a secularist grouping, because there are
countries in this alliance, like Saudi Arabia, which are
religious states to a large degree. Nonetheless, what
brought members of this group together was their
antipathy to organized Islamist parties, namely, the
Muslim Brotherhood. The alliance was again strengthened by these states’ opposition to the more extremist
and radical group, ISIL, in the summer of 2014.
Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE were opposed to
Egyptian president Mohammed Morsi during his year
in power (2012-13) because they saw the Brotherhood
as not only destabilizing to Egypt—a cornerstone
country in the region—but also potentially bringing
instability to their own countries through Brotherhood-affiliated organizations. Ironically, in the 1960s,
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when Egypt and Saudi Arabia were bitter enemies,
Saudi Arabia gave refuge to Egyptian Muslim Brothers fleeing Nasser’s persecutions. But at some point
over the past several years (the exact point is a subject
of some debate among political analysts), Saudi Arabia turned against the Brotherhood, while the UAE
has long harbored misgivings about the Islamist organization. On the other hand, Qatar, which has often
bucked the consensus within the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) states, became Morsi and the Brotherhood’s principal Arab supporter.14
When public opposition mounted in Egypt against
Morsi in June 2013, culminating in Sisi’s ouster of
Morsi on July 3 and a subsequent crackdown on the
entire Brotherhood apparatus, Saudi Arabia, UAE,
and Kuwait supported this development and sent
some $12 billion in aid to Egypt in the months that
followed. This substantial assistance allowed Egypt’s
new administration, led by temporary president and
head of the Supreme Constitutional Court Adly Manour—though Sisi was the power behind the scene—
to weather a major political crisis. The crisis culminated in the regime’s violent dispersal of two major
Brotherhood’s protest encampments in mid-August
2013, causing hundreds of deaths, and the suspension
of most U.S. military assistance in October 2013. Egypt
felt so buoyed by this infusion of Saudi, UAE, and
Kuwaiti aid that it even returned a couple of billion
dollars that Qatar had sent to Egypt during the Morsi
presidency. Over the next 2 years, total Arab Gulf aid
pledges to Egypt may have risen to upward of $20
billion, which dwarfed the annual U.S. assistance of
roughly $1.5 billion ($1.3 billion in military aid and
$200 million in economic assistance).15
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Outside of the Egypt-Saudi Arabia-UAE-Kuwait
grouping, this alliance has included secular factions in
Libya (represented by the Tobruk government), secularists within Tunisia, and the Jordanian government.
In August 2014, Egyptian and UAE warplanes even
attacked militias of the Islamist government in Tripoli,
Libya.16 The Tripoli government includes the Libyan
Muslim Brotherhood organization.
Meanwhile, Tunisia’s secularists, perhaps galvanized by developments in Egypt in 2013, mounted
their own opposition to the ruling Islamist En-Nahda
party. After two Tunisian secular leaders (one a trade
unionist, the other a politician) were gunned down in
the course of 9 months, secularists in Tunisia blamed
En-Nahda, not necessarily for the killings, but for creating what they described as a permissive environment for radical Salafi groups to operate. In the autumn of 2013, under this pressure, En-Nahda agreed
to a timetable in which it would resign from power in
early-2014, and accept a technocratic, caretaker government that would rule until new parliamentary and
presidential elections were held later in 2014.17 In these
parliamentary elections, En-Nahda came in second,
while the secular Nidaa Tounes party came in first. After some political maneuvering, Nidaa Tounes agreed
to take En-Nahda into the government as a junior coalition member. Meanwhile, the Nidaa Tounes leader,
Beji Caid Essebsi, won the presidency. Although Tunisia’s political crisis between secularists and Islamists
ended peacefully—perhaps because the leader of
En-Nahda, Rachid Gannouchi, is a much more savvy
and astute politician than Morsi of Egypt—Tunisia’s
democratic success story (the only one to come out of
the Arab Spring) has been challenged of late by two
significant terrorist attacks against foreign tourists by
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individuals linked to ISIL. These attacks (one at a museum, the other at a beach resort) resulted in 60 deaths
and caused the cancellation of major tourist bookings
and a sharp blow to Tunisia’s fledgling economy.
These developments have led the Tunisian president
to declare a state of emergency in early-July 2015, giving security forces more power and limiting the right
of public assembly.18
Post-Arab Spring Libya has taken a much different course. After the ouster and killing of long-time
authoritarian ruler, Muammar Qadhafi, in 2011, the
country was beset with numerous problems, chief of
which were weak central authority and the proliferation of militias who refused to give up their arms.
After parliamentary elections in June 2014, in which
secularists won a plurality, two rival governments
were established. Militias loyal to each government
have been engaged in a series of battles. The only
mechanism keeping these two governments afloat has
been the decision by Libya’s Central Bank to divide
the country’s oil revenues between them.19
The United Nations (UN), with the support of the
European Union (EU) and the United States, has attempted to foster reconciliation talks between the two
rival factions. In July 2015, most Libyan political factions signed a tentative agreement in Morocco, under
UN auspices, that would make the House of Representatives in Tobruk the legislative authority and
would call for a government of national unity encompassing these factions.20 It remains to be seen if this
agreement will be carried out and if the international
community is ready to send peacekeeping troops to
the country. A complicating factor in the Libyan situation is the presence of ISIL, particularly in the central
coastal city of Derna. While both the Tobruk and Tripoli governments consider ISIL a threat—ISIL’s brutal15

ity is well-known, after its adherents decapitated 21
Egyptian Coptic Christians in early-2015 in Derna—it
is not clear whether having a common enemy will be
enough to bring about true national reconciliation.
As for Jordan, the monarchy weathered the Arab
Spring and remained in control, though social and political issues continue to fester. Jordan’s King Abdullah has embraced countries in the anti-Islamist grouping, like Egypt and Libya’s Tobruk government. In
April 2015, King Abdullah and his army’s chief of
staff, Lieutenant General Mashal Zaben, warmly received Libya’s controversial General Haftar—allied
to the Tobruk government—who was on a mission to
see if Libyan forces loyal to that government would be
able to be trained by Jordanian forces in counterterrorism and special forces operations. It is not clear what
came out of these talks. Jordan’s official statement
noted only that King Abdullah voiced support for
Libya to confront “terrorist” organizations.21 The fact
that both Jordanians and Libyans have been victims
of ISIL attacks—in 2015, ISIL burned alive a Jordanian
fighter pilot who was captured after an anti-ISIL mission in Syria—may help to bolster Libyan-Jordanian
relations.
This grouping of Arab states, which first came together in opposition to the Muslim Brotherhood and
other Islamist political parties, has been strengthened
by its common opposition to the more radical and
extremist ISIL organization. When ISIL was only in
eastern Syria, it was initially seen as one of several extremist groups operating in the Syrian civil war. However, when ISIL expanded its reach in the summer of
2014 by invading Iraq and quickly taking the northern
city of Mosul and threatening Baghdad, the region
and the world took notice. ISIL’s brutality—such as
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the persecution of Yazidis and Christians, the beheadings of Western hostages, and the burning to death of
the Jordanian pilot—all culminated in a U.S.-led effort to create a large coalition of states from the West
and from the region to combat ISIL.22 Many European
states were alarmed that significant numbers of disaffected Muslim youths were traveling to Syria and
Iraq to join ISIL. Many Arab countries were alarmed
that extremist organizations in their own countries
were pledging allegiance to ISIL and were fearful that
their nationals who had gone to fight in Syria and Iraq
were now coming back to undertake terrorist attacks
at home, after having been battle trained. A number of
Arab countries—such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and
Jordan—joined the United States in undertaking air
strikes against ISIL.23
In the aftermath of the beheadings of 21 Egyptian
Coptic Christians in Libya by ISIL in February 2015,
Egypt, under President Sisi, attacked ISIL targets
there by air. But Sisi also used this incident to call for
the creation of a joint Arab military force to confront
such extremist groups.24 He then took the idea to the
Arab summit meeting he hosted in Sharm El-Sheikh in
late-March 2015, and stated shortly before the meeting
began that such a force was needed to “preserve what
is left of stability” in the Arab world and because of
the “great challenges” facing the region. With Saudi
support, the Arab summit endorsed the idea of a joint
force “in principle” and later said that it would be
made up of 40,000 elite troops and supported by jets,
warships, and light armor. Although contributions
by Arab states would be voluntary, the Arab League
Secretary General said that the proposed force “sends
a clear message that the Arab states can agree on a
plan to defend themselves.”25 Egypt also hosted sub-
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sequent meetings of Arab military chief of staffs to explore this proposal further, but many analysts in the
region have expressed doubts that such a force will
ever come into being. The last time this idea was proposed was in 1950 in the wake of the first Arab-Israeli
War, but nothing came of it. While several Arab states
have attacked extremists like ISIL from the air, they
have not wanted to send “boots on the ground.”
Despite the opposition of many Arab states to ISIL,
the terrorist organization has been able to sell its radical brand to potential adherents, so much so that many
extremists in the region have switched their allegiance
from al-Qaeda to ISIL. Moreover, ISIL has established
a so-called “Islamic Caliphate” in the heart of the Levant and has a sophisticated social media operation.
This has helped ensure that its message gets across
to millions of disaffected young Muslims, many of
whom have become captivated by ISIL’s successes
on the battlefield and its very strict interpretation of
Islam, which is supposedly modeled on the early Islamic community of the 7th Century. Hence, it is not
surprising that countries in the anti-Islamist grouping
have also focused on ISIL and its affiliated groups,
which have sprung up in the region and become major terrorist hubs. For example, the Tunisians who attacked foreign tourists at the Bardo Museum in March
2015 and at the Sousse beach resort reportedly were
trained by an ISIL group in Derna, Libya.26 In Egypt,
the terrorist group operating in the Sinai Peninsula,
Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, pledged allegiance to ISIL and
now calls itself the “Sinai Province.” On July 1, 2015,
this group directed a series of coordinated attacks in
the north Sinai against regime security forces, leading to scores of deaths.27 This group has also attacked
targets in mainland Egypt and, on July 16, 2015, even
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launched a successful missile attack on an Egyptian
naval vessel off the Sinai coast.28
Who, then, are the detractors of the anti-Islamist
group? Within the Arab world, Qatar has played this
role by its support for the Muslim Brotherhood and
Hamas, which grew out of the Palestinian Muslim
Brotherhood. Outside of the Arab countries, Turkey,
under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Islamist AKP party, is also an opponent of this alliance.
Erdogan sharply denounced the removal of Morsi
from power in 2013 and has given refuge to Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood leaders and activists, who were
able to escape the crackdown on the organization in
the summer of 2013. From Turkey, the Muslim Brotherhood has been able to regroup to some extent and
to establish a media center that has broadcast anti-Sisi
programs.29 Erdogan has also supported the Islamist
government in Tripoli, Libya.
Although the states in the anti-Islamist grouping
of states see eye-to-eye on most issues, there seem to
be differences on the Syrian question, especially between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The Saudis see the
government of Bashar Assad as the chief problem in
that crisis and want him to go. While the Saudis have
opposed the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, they have
reportedly aided Islamist groups in the Syrian civil
war partly because such forces have been the most
effective in fighting the Assad regime. The Saudis’
antipathy for Bashar Assad is partly personal, partly
strategic, and partly religious. Regarding the first,
the Saudis have never forgiven Bashar for insulting
them in the wake of the Hezbollah-Israel conflict in
2006, when Riyadh opposed Hezbollah’s claim to be
the champion of the so-called Arab cause against Israel. Strategically, the Saudis see the Assad regime as
an Iranian proxy and as part of a wider Sunni-Shia
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conflict stoked by Tehran. Since most of the victims
of the Assad regime have been Sunnis, the Saudis see
Assad’s Alawite-dominated regime as carrying on a
religious war.30
Egypt, on the other hand, is fearful that a collapse
of the Assad regime will pave the way for Islamist
groups—including the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,
the al-Qaeda-linked Al-Nusra Front, and even ISIL—
to take over the country, creating a radical Islamist
regime in the heart of the Levant. Egypt’s military establishment was alarmed when then-president Morsi
called on Egyptians in 2012 to go to Syria to fight with
the anti-Assad rebels, fearing “blowback” by returning Egyptian fighters, some of whom have probably
joined the extremists based in the Sinai Peninsula.
Hence, the Egyptian leadership under Sisi sees Assad
as the lesser of two evils and hopes for a political solution to the crisis in which Assad, or at least the Syrian
military, is part of the solution.
These differences came to a head during the Arab
summit meeting Egypt hosted in Sharm El-Shaikh in
late-March 2015. At this meeting, Sisi reportedly read
out loud a letter from Russian President Vladimir
Putin, a backer of Assad, who advocated a political
solution to the Syrian crisis, implying that this was
Egypt’s policy as well. In response, then-Saudi foreign
minister Saud al-Faisal stated, while television cameras were rolling, that the Russians “are a main part
of the miseries that affects the Syrian people.” Not
wanting to get into a public spat with his Saudi benefactors, Sisi thanked Saud al-Faisal for his remarks
and then quickly changed the subject.31 However, in
the aftermath of this controversy, a popular Egyptian
talk show host, who is reportedly close to Sisi, said
that “Arab oil money from Saudi Arabia and Qatar is
also killing the Syrian people.” Not to be outdone, a
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Saudi journalist responded by noting that the talk
show host’s “excesses” required action, and implied
that the host’s message must have had the Egyptian
regime’s approval “because it is the regime’s media.”32
Two months after these diatribes, the new Saudi
foreign minister, Adel al-Jubeir, flew to Cairo to
hold meetings with his Egyptian counterpart, Sameh
Shoukry. The two diplomats did their best to downplay their differences in public, to the point that Jubeir claimed he did not know where “impressions”
of discord between the two countries came from, and
Shoukry said their policies on Syria “complement”
each other. Jubeir emphasized the point that, “we are
all seeking to remove Bashar Assad from power,” restore “peace and stability in Syria,” and “protect the
government and military institutions” there “to beable to deal with the challenges after the Assad regime.” Shoukry said that Egypt was working with the
Russians to convince the Syrian government to take
part in a political process involving various factions,
while Jubeir said that contacts with Russia aimed to
convince Moscow to “give up on Bashar” or to exert
efforts to convince him to “give up power.”33
In addition to their differences over Syria, Egyptian and Saudi relations were also strained over
leaked discussions in Sisi’s Ministry of Defense that
revealed derogatory comments about Gulf Arabs by
some Egyptian officials. One analyst has noted that
such leaks “have generated considerable anger among
Egypt’s Gulf Arab allies, as has its unresponsiveness
to their desire to see consistent economic reforms and
greater levels of policy coordination.” Moreover, the
ascension to power by Saudi King Salman has been
“accompanied by a tempering of Saudi policy on the
Muslim Brotherhood.”34 The new Saudi leadership, in
the view of this analyst, “is less zealous in its support
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for Egypt’s undifferentiated and unrelenting crackdown” on the Muslim Brotherhood. Saudi and other
Gulf Arab aid to Egypt may decrease dramatically in
the coming years, though in a crisis, it is hard to imagine that the Saudis will allow Egypt to experience the
severe economic distress that could threaten domestic
stability. One of the reasons Egypt is currently helping the Saudis in the Yemeni crisis—supporting the
Saudis’ anti-Houthi campaign—is to demonstrate the
importance of Egypt to Saudi strategic interests. In
essence, the Egyptians see aiding Saudi Arabia in the
anti-Houthi struggle as an insurance policy to keep
the Saudi assistance going.
Hence, while this anti-Islamist grouping in the
Arab world has become one of the alliances in the region, it is not necessarily a coherent one. Part of the
problem with this alliance relates to long-standing rivalries in the Arab world; part also has to do with tensions inherent between republican regimes and monarchies, with the latter tending to see religion as part
of their legitimacy. Hence, while these countries—or
more specifically, their ruling elites may share an
antipathy toward Islamist groups like the Muslim
Brotherhood, the monarchies (or sheikhdoms) do
not usually subscribe to the idea of secularism that is
prevalent among the ruling elites in so-called republican regimes like Egypt and Tunisia, and among the
Libyan factions supporting the Tobruk government.
The Anti-Shia Alliance.
The other major grouping in the Arab world is the
anti-Shia coalition, which came together rather decisively in March 2015 in the wake of the Houthi takeover of much of Yemen. The Houthis are members
of the Zaidi branch of Shia Islam, whose traditional
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homeland is the northern part of Yemen. In September 2014, the Houthis, in the midst of the political
chaos that had engulfed Yemen over the past several
years, moved south and seized most of Yemen’s capital city of Sana. In the early part of 2015, the Houthis
then took over the institutions of the Yemeni government, placed Yemeni President Hadi under house arrest, and moved further south toward the port city of
Aden. They were aided in these moves by forces loyal
to former Yemeni president Saleh, who had resigned
from the presidency in 2012 amidst domestic and foreign pressure. When the Houthis appeared poised to
take Aden, Hadi and some members of his government, who had escaped to that city, then escaped to
Saudi Arabia.35
As a Shia group (though they differ doctrinally
somewhat from the mainstream “Twelver” Shias of
Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon), the Houthis have
received some military and financial aid from Iran,
including weapons and munitions, particularly after
2011.36 Although the extent of Iranian aid is unknown
and may be exaggerated because Yemen is flush with
weapons from previous conflicts, the Iran-Houthi
connection has alarmed neighboring countries, particularly Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has long been
concerned about Shia activism in the region, but its
worries have been heightened by developments over
the past several years—including a resurgent Iran, the
emergence of a Shia regime in Iraq with close ties to
Iran, Hezbollah militancy in Lebanon, and military assistance to the Assad regime in the Syrian civil war.
Another factor is instability in nearby Bahrain, whose
Sunni monarchy resides over a restive Shia majority.
This led to demonstrations for political change in 2011,
prompting Saudi and UAE intervention on the side of
the monarchy.
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Saudi Arabia is a strict Islamic state that follows
the Wahhabi school of Sunni Islam. The Wahhabi doctrine follows the puritanical teachings of its founder,
Mohammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, who, in the 18th
Century, sought to purify the tribes of the Najd region
of supposedly un-Islamic behaviors and received the
protection of and formed an alliance with Mohammad
ibn Saud, the ancestor of today’s ruling al-Saud family.37 The alliance between the descendants of these
two leaders has lasted to the present day and, consequently, there is a religious dimension to Saudi political and military opposition to Iranian and Shia groups
in general, as some Wahhabi clerics consider the Shia
heretics. The Saudis also have a significant Shia population (about 10 percent of the total population of the
kingdom), which is concentrated in the important oilproducing region of the eastern province. The Shia of
Saudi Arabia long have complained of discriminatory
practices by the Saudi government, and there have
been periodic eruptions of unrest in their area. The
latest were in 2011-12, as some Shia staged demonstrations in line with what was happening elsewhere
in the Arab world.38 These demonstrations were put
down by force, and the area has been relatively quiet
of late, but Saudi officials are always concerned about
security in this province, and they see an Iranian hand,
whether real or imagined, stoking the flames of unrest.
Ever since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, SaudiIranian relations have been uneasy to hostile, not
helped by the fact that Iran’s revolutionary leader,
Ayatollah Khomeini, called monarchy incompatible
with Islam.39 In essence, Khomeini was saying that the
Saudi ruling family was unfit to govern the Islamic
holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The Saudis, in turn,
saw revolutionary Iran as a threat, and supported Iraq

24

with billions of dollars in aid in its bloody 8-year war
with Iran from 1980-88.
Although by 1990, both Iran and Saudi Arabia opposed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his takeover
of Kuwait, this did not mean that their own differences melted away. In particular, the Saudis continued
to rely on the U.S. military presence in the region as
a protector, whereas Iran saw the United States as its
strategic enemy.
It appears that the Iraq War of 2003 set in motion
a series of events that led the Saudis (and some other
Sunni Arab countries) to be even more concerned
about Iran. Although the Saudis did not shed any tears
when Saddam Hussein and his regime were overthrown in the wake of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq,
they came to see Iraq’s new leaders, now dominated
by the Shia, with alarm. Some Shia groups within the
new ruling coalition had received sanctuary and support from Iran over the years. In the aftermath of the
war, when Iraqi Sunni insurgents battled the new Iraqi
government and coalition forces and al-Qaeda saw an
opportunity to exploit Sunni grievances, Iran came to
the aid of the Shia militia groups. For a time in 200607, Iraq even descended into sectarian warfare, with
roaming bands of Sunni and Shia death squads. Under
these circumstances, Iran’s influence grew even stronger. Hence, from the Saudi perspective, the Iraq War
opened the floodgates in Iraq to Iranian influence. As
a sign of their displeasure with the new situation in
Iraq, Saudis did not send an ambassador to Baghdad
despite many entreaties by the United States to do so.40
The rise of ISIL in the more recent period (201415) has also deepened Iran’s influence in Iraq. Because
the Iraqi army has proven to be an ineffectual fighting force, the Iraqi government has come to rely on
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Shia militia groups to defend Baghdad and take the
offensive against ISIL forces. These forces have been
aided by Iran’s Revolutionary Guards “Quds” force,
whose commander was even in Iraq directing the military activities of some of these Shia militias against
ISIL.41 Outside of Iraq, the Saudis see an Iranian hand
in stoking other Shia-Sunni conflicts. In Lebanon, the
Saudis long have been alarmed by the rise of Hezbollah (now part of the ruling coalition) and Iran’s close
connection to this militant Shia organization. The Saudis had backed a coalition representing Sunni interests
under the leadership of Saad Hariri, son of the former
prime minister, Rafik Hariri, a dual Lebanese-Saudi
national and businessman who was believed to have
been assassinated on orders of the Syrian government
in 2005. But that coalition was defeated in the polls by
Hezbollah.
Alarming still to the Saudis has been Hezbollah’s
military support for the Assad regime in the Syrian civil
war. Although many Hezbollah soldiers have died in
this war, their ongoing assistance in the fight against
Syrian rebel groups has enabled the civil war to drag
on for years. This military support has been crucial
to keeping the regime in power, because its Alawite
base is small and has suffered numerous casualties.
There have also been reports of Iranian Revolutionary
Guard forces, and even some Iraqi Shia groups, fighting on the side of the Assad regime.42 Hence, the Saudis see an Iranian-Shia nexus from Tehran to Baghdad
to Damascus to Beirut that needs to be opposed, in
addition to the Shia in Bahrain as well in its the eastern province. When the Houthis went on the march
in Yemen, the Saudis saw this nexus encircling them.
From the Saudi perspective, the Yemen crisis was the
last straw, because it was in their backyard.
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In March 2015, the Saudis were able to assemble
a coalition of Arab states to participate in this antiHouthi military campaign, dubbed Operation DECISIVE STORM. This coalition, representing Sunniruled states, included all of the GCC states except
Oman—that is, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait,
and Bahrain—plus Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Morocco,
and Yemen’s exiled government.43 A statement from
the Arab Gulf states listed previously, said that the
operation was “in response to a request” from Yemeni
President Hadi “to protect Yemen from the aggression
of Houthi militias.” The statement went on to accuse
the Houthis of being a “tool of foreign powers that
seeks to harm the security and stability of Yemen,” a
clear reference to Iran.44
According to various press reports, the Saudis’ military contribution to this campaign is 100 warplanes,
plus 150,000 soldiers mobilized near the Yemeni border. The UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan have also been contributing warplanes,
perhaps 85 in total, though it is unclear which countries have also been participating in airstrikes. Egypt
reportedly has deployed four naval ships near the
strategically important Bab el-Mandeb Strait that connects the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea, plus air assets.45
After several months of airstrikes, this coalition,
led by Saudi Arabia, was not very successful in defeating the Houthis. The most success it had was in
dislodging the Houthis from the airport and port of
Aden in mid-July 2015, allowing some members of
the Hadi government to return from Saudi Arabia to
the city of Aden. According to various press reports,
it appears that many of the casualties from the Saudi-led airstrikes have been Yemeni civilians, and the
destruction meted out to infrastructure sites by the
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coalition air strikes has exacerbated the humanitarian
crisis in the country.46 As the poorest country in the
Arab world, Yemen was already in dire straits before
this war, and is now suffering from shortages of food,
water, and medicine. The UN has helped to arrange
for a couple of ceasefires in order for international
aid to be delivered to the people, but these have been
short-lived.
This anti-Houthi or anti-Shia alliance, like the antiIslamist alliance, is not very coherent. It is likely that
some of the Arab countries that joined this alliance
have done so to stay in the good graces of the Saudis because of hoped-for financial rewards. Although
many of these countries do not like the fact that Iran
is meddling in Arab affairs and has come to the aid
of various Shia militant groups in the region, they are
probably not as paranoid about Iran as are the Saudis.
For example, the Egyptian and Iranian foreign
ministers held what appeared to be a friendly meeting
on the sidelines of the Non-aligned Movement’s gathering in April 2015.47 Egypt’s participation in the antiHouthi campaign is more motivated to protect its own
economic interests than because of fears of Iran’s advances in the region. These economic interests include
not only ensuring Saudi largesse, but ensuring the Bab
el-Mandeb Strait stays open, because that waterway is
on the route for ships going to and from the Mediterranean and the Arabian Seas via the Red Sea and Egypt’s
Suez Canal, which generates over $5 billion in tolls a
year for Cairo. Although Egyptian President Sisi at
the Arab summit in Sharm El-Sheikh said that “Arab
problems should be handled by Arabs themselves”48
—an indirect criticism of Iran—Egypt appears more
interested in stopping ISIL and its affiliates than in
opposing Iran and its proxies.
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That said, Egypt is demonstrating its commitment
in this anti-Houthi campaign because it needs to show
the Saudis that it can come to their aid in time of need,
just as the Saudis helped Egypt during her time of
need in 2013, in the wake of its problematic domestic
situation. Egypt even prevented its airspace from being used by a Houthi delegation flying to Geneva in
June 2015 to participate in UN-sponsored peace talks
with the Yemeni government in exile, delaying this
group’s arrival by a day.49 But while Egyptian officials
have said publicly that they might consider sending
ground troops to Yemen if asked (presumably by the
Saudis),50 they would be extremely wary of doing so,
given their unhappy experience in Yemen in the 1960s.
Outside the Yemen conflict, Egypt and Saudi Arabia differ on the Syrian crisis, despite their best efforts
to paper over such divisions. Egypt sees the Syrian
civil war not so much as a sectarian conflict, pitting
an Iran-supported regime against Sunni rebels, but
as a conflict between a secular government and rebel
groups that include radical Islamists who want not
only to transform Syria but the entire region. While
Saudi Arabia and Qatar are on different sides of the
anti-Islamist issue with regard to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and some other Islamist groups in
the region, they appear to be supporting a broad array
of rebel forces in the Syrian civil war. These include
Islamist ones that cooperate with Al-Nusra Front,
which is linked to al-Qaeda.51
Jordan may be closest to the Saudis in seeing the
Houthi conflict as part of a larger Shia threat. Indeed,
it was King Abdullah of Jordan who voiced concerns
about what he saw as a “Shia crescent” in 2004.52
Nonetheless, with ISIL very nearby in Syria and Iraq,
Jordan is probably more concerned about ISIL trying
to take over Jordanian territory than he is about the
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Shia and Iran. There are hardly any Jordanian nationals who are Shia, the vast majority being Sunni Muslims. Although most Jordanians turned decisively
against ISIL after the captured Jordanian pilot was
cruelly burned alive in early-2015, King Abdullah still
needs to worry about Sunni radicals within his own
kingdom.
With the exception of Oman, most of the Arab Gulf
states share Saudi Arabia’s antipathy and “paranoia”
about Iran and Shia groups. They fear that Iran will
continue to try to stir up their own Shia communities
in an effort to pressure them. The Saudi and UAE intervention in the Bahrain crisis in 2011 was as much an
anti-Shia intervention (and an act of protecting a fellow
Sunni monarch), than it was stopping another Arab
Spring democratization experiment. That said, Kuwait
might be in a different position with regard to the sectarian issue, perhaps because Iran is only a few miles
away and because Kuwait has done a better job than
most other Arab Gulf countries in integrating its Shia
population into its society. When an ISIL group bombed
a Shia mosque in Kuwait in July 2015, the Kuwaiti
government said it was an attack on the entire Kuwaiti
nation.53
WHAT HAS BEEN THE ROLE OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THESE ALLIANCES?
Regarding the anti-Islamist alliance, at least the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood, the United States has
shied away from embracing it. Official U.S. policy is
not to lump the Brotherhood together with groups
like al-Qaeda and ISIL, and the United States has supported UN reconciliation talks between the Libyan
Islamist government (which includes members of the
Libyan Muslim Brotherhood) and the secular Tobruk
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government. In general, the United States has avoided
taking a stand on the Islamist-secularist divide in the
region. U.S. policy, articulated first in 1992, is to favor
inclusivity of all nonviolent political groups, secular
or Islamist, in these societies, and not to appear to
be siding with secular groups just because they are
secular.54
Such a policy has put the United States in a difficult position with regard to Egypt. Although in July
2013 the United States initially called for the release of
Morsi from prison and criticized the suspension of the
Egyptian constitution—and later criticized in more
forceful terms the violent crackdown in mid-August
2013 of the Muslim Brotherhood protest encampments
that led to more than 600 deaths in a single day—it
also tried to steer a middle course by not calling Morsi’s ouster a “coup,” because that would have triggered an automatic cut-off of U.S. assistance to Egypt
under U.S. law.55 Nonetheless, in October 2013, after
an interagency review, the United States suspended
most military assistance to Egypt because of these
anti-democratic developments. This suspension of aid
did not lead to a change of Egyptian behavior, however. The combination of Egyptian pride and generous Gulf Arab aid to Cairo contributed to the regime’s
unrepentant policies against the Muslim Brotherhood
as well as against some of its secular critics. In the
spring of 2015, the United States decided that rebuilding strategic links to Cairo was paramount and fully
restored the suspended aid.56 Despite this restoration
of aid, the United States never adopted the Egyptian
regime’s view that the Muslim Brotherhood is a terrorist organization, and the United States criticized
quick trials and the meting out of capital punishment
sentences against Brotherhood leaders and activists as
well as other human rights violations.
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Therefore, while the United States is a secular
country and most U.S. policymakers are inclined to
be personally sympathetic with Arab secularists’ fears
of Islamist movements—even nonviolent Islamist
ones—it has not tried to pick sides in this internal fight
between secularists and Islamists. One can argue,
however, that by restoring aid to the secular Sisi government, the United States is indeed taking sides. Yet,
the decision to restore aid was not undertaken to send
a signal about secularism versus Islamism. Instead, it
was done primarily to rebuild trust with the government of the most populous state in the Arab world,
which has played a pivotal role in the region and is
facing a significant terrorism problem. If the United
States had such a problem with nonviolent Islamists,
it would certainly not have tried to cultivate good relations with the Morsi government during the 201213 period.57 Indeed, because of these ties, the United
States was accused by secular Egyptians of favoring
an authoritarian Islamist regime, and because of this
perception, U.S. standing in Egypt reached a low point
in the summer of 2013 after Morsi was ousted.
If anything, the United States has tried to be neutral in the disputes between Islamists and secularists.
Tunisia is a prime example. The United States maintained good relations with the Tunisian government
when En-Nahda was the dominant party in the government but then stayed out of the way when Tunisian secularists pressured En-Nahda in the summer
and autumn of 2013 to step down from power and
agree to a technocratic caretaker government, new
elections in 2014, and the drafting of a new constitution. These events all occurred peacefully for the most
part—avoiding the violent turmoil that had engulfed
Egypt. Although pressure from secularists compelled
En-Nahda to give up power, En-Nahda emerged as
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the second strongest party in parliament and became
a junior partner in the government. The United States
praised Tunisia’s democratic experiment, increased
aid to the country, and exalted its new constitution as
the most progressive in the Arab world. Obama received the Tunisian president in the White House.58
In confronting violent Islamist extremist groups
like al-Qaeda and ISIL, the United States has wholeheartedly embraced the alliance and has taken the
lead, in fact, in assembling a 60-member state coalition opposed to ISIL, even appointing a U.S. Army
general to coordinate activities in this coalition. Concerning the anti-Shia alliance this approach also has to
be parsed out in terms of U.S. policy. Concerning the
anti-Houthi alliance, the United States has supported
the Saudi effort with logistical and intelligence assistance, according to press reports, and considers Hadi
the legitimate president of Yemen. Secretary of State
John Kerry, even in the midst of the sensitive nuclear
negotiations with Iran, publicly warned Tehran about
meddling in the Yemeni conflict.59 However, the chief
U.S. concern in Yemen is preventing al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and now ISIL from taking
advantage of the instability in the country to make
gains. Indeed, in the wake of the Houthi advances and
the chaos that ensued in Yemen, the United States was
compelled to withdraw its Army Special Forces units,
which had been aiding the Yemeni counterterrorism
effort. The United States has favored a political solution to the Yemeni crisis and thus helped to foster, with
Omani diplomats, talks in Oman between the Houthis
and the Hadi government.60 These talks paved the way
for follow-up talks in Geneva, but those talks ended in
acrimony in June 2015. The United States has also expressed concern for the growing humanitarian crisis
in Yemen.61
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Although the United States has supported the antiHouthi effort to some degree, it has not supported the
broader anti-Shia grouping. First, as a practical matter, the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad is a
U.S. ally, and the United States is doing what it can to
shore up the Iraqi army to fight against ISIL, while acknowledging that the Shia militias have been more effective in this struggle.62 Second, with the recent, successful conclusion of the P5+1 negotiations with Iran
over the nuclear issue, the United States is hoping that
Iran might become a more moderate country.63 Supporting an anti-Shia stance would wreck any chances
of a U.S.-Iranian rapproachment, which might emerge
down the road if Iran does indeed moderate. Third, it
would be out of character for the United States to take
sides in a sectarian conflict, even though some Shia
groups, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Shia-dominated states, like Assad’s Syria, are opposed to U.S.
policies. Finally, there are legitimate human rights
concerns voiced by Shia in Sunni-dominated states
like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. If the United States
decided to drop those concerns merely because they
were expressed by the Shia, it would make a mockery
of U.S. human rights policy.
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE
UNITED STATES IN THESE ALLIANCES:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Given these new Arab alliances, how should the
United States react to them in the future? Moreover,
what are the opportunities, challenges, and even
downsides of these alliances for U.S. policy?
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How Should the United States Respond
to the Anti-Islamist Alliance?
First, with regard to the anti-Islamist grouping,
the United States has had long-standing political, security, and economic relationships with most of these
states. The United States should continue its relations
with these states, as they serve many broad U.S. policy
goals. For example, with Egypt, the U.S. decision to lift
the suspension of the military assistance in the spring
of 2015 has helped to restore the important U.S.-Egyptian security relationship. This is especially important, given the rise in terrorist activities in the Sinai
and elsewhere in Egypt by the ISIL-affiliated group
now called the “Sinai Province” but formerly known
as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. The coordinated attacks by
this terrorist group on July 1, 2015, in which as many
as 70 Egyptian soldiers and civilians were killed, and
the temporary takeover of the town of Sheikh Zuweid
in the Sinai by the terrorists, underscored the serious
nature of this threat to Egyptian security.64
Moreover, the restoration of aid to Egypt may work
to weaken the conspiracy theory prevalent among
Egyptian secularists that the United States secretly
made a pact with the Muslim Brotherhood before and
during the Morsi presidency to weaken the Egyptian
state. Although such a theory sounds far-fetched to
American ears, it was widely believed by many secularists in Egypt. Unfortunately, the pro-government
Egyptian press hyped up such conspiracy theories.
The more the United States can show that it is aiding
the Egyptian government in its anti-terrorism campaign, the better the chances that such sentiments will
diminish over time.
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However, the downside of this support for the Sisi
government is that the United States is seen by opponents of the regime as contributing to state repression. The Sisi government has not only gone after the
Muslim Brotherhood and declared it a terrorist organization, but it has imposed harsh penalties on those
engaged in public protests, journalists who have criticized the government, and secular activists opposed
to the restrictions on democracy. As an example, in
July 2015, the Sisi government wanted to impose jail
sentences on reporters who did not follow the government’s own reporting of terrorist incidents. Only when
the Journalists Syndicate expressed strong opposition
to this proposed law did the government back down,
but only partially, saying it would impose large fines
on such journalists instead.65
The U.S. State Department’s criticisms of such antidemocratic policies notwithstanding, the fact that the
United States has restored all aid to Egypt has given
Egyptian dissidents the impression that the United
States is back to its old, Mubarak-era, policies of facilitating this repression or at least looking the other way
while gross human rights violations are occurring.
The Egyptian government’s repression of the Muslim Brotherhood has also put the United States in a political quandary with regard to this Islamist group. Unlike Egypt under Sisi, the United States has not agreed
with the designation of the Muslim Brotherhood as a
terrorist organization, and it has even allowed a few
Brotherhood members to visit the United States over
the past 2 years. However, the regime’s severe crackdown on the Brotherhood, which has included the incarceration of most of its leaders, has broken up the
top-down decisionmaking apparatus of the organization, leading some younger members to engage in violence against the regime or join up with more radical
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groups like the former Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. Hence, in
a certain way, the regime’s crackdown on the Brotherhood has become a self-fulfilling prophecy, because it
has driven at least some members of the Brotherhood
to commit violent acts66—and violence has been the
standard test by which the United States has generally
judged Islamist groups as legitimate or illegitimate. In
other words, official U.S. policy since 1992 is that the
United States will deal with Islamist groups as long as
those groups do not engage in violence.
It appears that U.S. officials, in private conversations with their Egyptian counterparts, have raised
human rights concerns even while expressing support
for Egypt’s counterterrorism campaign.67 Whether
these expressions of concern are having any effect on
Egyptian government behavior remains to be seen.
President Sisi did remove Minister of Interior Mohammad Ibrahim from his post in early-2015, perhaps because of mounting domestic and international concern
about police brutality and other human rights abuses,
but it is not clear whether this change at the top is having any effect on actual practices on the ground.
Over the short term, the perception among Islamists
that the United States is taking a stand in support of
repression of their cadres does not have serious consequences for U.S. policy because it is hard to imagine
that the Brotherhood will come back to power anytime soon. However, over the long term, the perception of the United States as tacitly or directly supporting the Sisi government in this repression may pose a
serious risk for the United States if the Brotherhood
comes back to power down the road. Here, the example of U.S.-Iranian relations may be illustrative. The
U.S-supported coup against Iranian nationalist leader
Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953, which resulted in the
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Shah becoming an absolute and repressive monarch,
may have resulted in close U.S.-Iranian strategic relations for some 25 years, but it all came crashing down
in 1979 when the Shah was overthrown.
What about the other states and parties? In the
Libyan civil war, the United States has supported
the UN’s efforts to try to bring the two sides together
through mediation. Although the Tobruk government
is the internationally recognized government in Libya,
the United States understands that it represents only
part of the country. Moreover, it is important for the
United States to pursue a policy that shows it is in favor of Libyan reconciliation with the exception of terrorist groups, some of which are now affiliated with
ISIL. Indeed, ISIL’s presence in Derna, Libya, and its
attacks against the interests of both the Tobruk and
Tripoli governments gives these factions something to
cooperate on—that is, working to rid Libya of the ISIL
menace. An interim agreement that was concluded in
Morocco in July 2015 under UN auspices—allowing
the Tobruk House of Representatives to be the main
legislative body and bringing the political factions together in a government of national unity—is probably
the best option at this point for a long-term solution to
the Libyan crisis. Some reports suggest that some EU
countries might send peacekeeping troops to Libya if
the agreement comes to fruition, and the United States
might use drone attacks against ISIL to prevent this
terrorist group from derailing the accord.68 Both of
these measures would be useful, but it remains to be
seen how the various factions will deal with the proliferation of militias in Libya. Unless this problem is
addressed and there is a buy-in to the agreement from
all Libyan factions except for those affiliated with
ISIL and al-Qaeda, the agreement will remain only
on paper.
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Given the recent, tentative accord in Libya, it is
important for the United States to weigh in on Egypt
and the UAE not to undertake any airstrikes against
factions allied to the Tripoli government, as it did in
August of 2014. A recent U.S. decision to sell Egypt
$100 million in sophisticated border surveillance
equipment should help ease Egyptian concerns about
terrorists and weapons being smuggled across the
porous Libyan-Egyptian border, many of which have
landed in the Sinai to the east.69 However, if Egyptian
nationals in Libya were again the victims of ISIL’s brutality, that would constitute a different situation. Since
the United States and its anti-ISIL coalition partners
are themselves undertaking air strikes against ISIL in
Syria and Iraq, the United States should support such
strikes by Egypt if they are, indeed, against ISIL targets in Libya and not against political factions linked
to Tripoli.
How Should the United States
Respond to the Anti-Shia Coalition?
The United States has already given the Saudis
intelligence and logistical support for its anti-Houthi
campaign, and has publicly warned Iran not to exacerbate the situation in Yemen by providing the Houthis
with weapons. But the United States has come to realize that there are liabilities to the Yemeni conflict.
First, while air strikes by the Saudis and their coalition allies may have freed parts of Aden from Houthi
control in the summer of 2015, they have generally not
dislodged the Houthis from the other, significant territory that it holds, including the capital city of Sana.70
Because air strikes have led to some 3,000 casualties as
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of July 2015, many of which have been civilians, being
on the side of the Saudis’ hardline tactics may have
long-term consequences for the United States, especially now that the humanitarian situation in Yemen is
so dire. It is not in U.S. interests for the Yemeni people
to see the United States as contributing to their hardships. U.S. policymakers should continue to counsel
restraint on the part of the Saudis and encourage them
to convince the Hadi government-in-exile to resume
negotiations with the Houthis, however difficult these
may be.
Houthi demands are not unreasonable, provided
the Houthis retreat to the northern area of Yemen.
These demands include a greater share of government
revenues and an end to Salafi Sunni Muslim preachers
proselytizing in their region.71 Although the Houthis
have voiced anti-U.S. slogans, they are potential allies
in the fight against ISIL and AQAP, similar to the Shia
militias of Iraq. A political solution to the Yemeni crisis
that would include Houthis in a governing coalition
would be an optimal scenario if it results in a more
stable Yemen. If stability were to return to Yemen, the
United States would be able to reopen its embassy and
return its Special Forces units to the country to help
Yemeni forces in their fight against AQAP and ISIL. It
should be remembered that AQAP has been the most
prominent al-Qaeda affiliate, which has launched
the most anti-U.S. plots, including those directed at
the U.S. homeland. Although the United States has
continued some drone strikes against AQAP, killing
AQAP leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi in June 2015 by one
of these strikes,72 its counterterrorism efforts would
be much more effective if Yemen stabilizes and U.S.
Special Forces were allowed to return.
The nuclear deal between Iran and the P5+1 countries, led by the United States, has inadvertently made
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the Saudis possibly less willing to compromise over
such Shia groups as the Houthis. One unnamed Saudi
diplomat told the press in the wake of this nuclear
agreement that if sanctions against Iran are lifted,
“Iran will try even harder to redesign the region.”73 In
the view of such officials, the money that will accrue
to Iran with the lifting of sanctions will embolden Tehran to pursue a more assertive foreign policy in the
area. Hence, the Saudis may be even less inclined to
show restraint in the proxy wars it is now engaged in
with Iran. Although Obama, at a Camp David summit
meeting with Arab Gulf leaders in May 2015, pledged
additional military support to them because of their
nervousness about a resurgent Iran, such offers of
support are unlikely to eliminate their fears.74
When it comes to Iraq, the United States should
continue to urge President Haider al-Abadi to make
his government more inclusive, by bringing in more
Sunnis, but there are limits to what the United States
can do. The long-repressed Shia of Iraq, who make up
almost 60 percent of the population, are unlikely to
give back any real power to the Sunnis. Abadi, while
more urbane than his predecessor, Nouri al-Maliki,
comes from the same Dawa party, which is a Shia Islamist party that was ruthlessly repressed under Saddam Hussein. Abadi and his supporters, along with
other Shia factions, will remain wary of the Sunnis
no matter what the United States does or does not
do. Until the Iraqi army is able to become an effective
fighting force—and that is a large unknown—Abadi
will continue to rely on Shia militias (and Iranian support) for his government’s defense. Therefore, over the
short term, the United States will be seen in the region
as supporting a Shia government in Baghdad, but this
perception has been in place since 2003 and is not new.
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What the United States can do is work with the Saudis
to try to entice some Iraqi Sunni tribes to break from
ISIL. Even if the prospect of giving such tribes (or their
representatives) a share of national power is unrealistic, perhaps they can be given broad autonomy and an
equitable share of national wealth from oil revenues,
to address at least some of their concerns about living
under a Shia-dominated regime.
As for Syria, what the United States can do to assuage Sunni Muslim concerns is to step up its vetting
process of Syrian rebels and assure the Sunnis that the
rebels are being trained not just to fight against ISIL,
but also against the Assad regime. Such messaging
may dispel some conspiratorial beliefs among Sunni
Muslims that the United States is secretly cooperating
with Iran in Syria to keep the Assad regime in place.
In the aftermath of the nuclear deal, the United
States should take advantage of the new goodwill
with Iran to discuss a number of regional issues that
could, perhaps, dampen the Sunni-Shia conflicts in
the wider area. Obama hinted at this approach at a
news conference in July 2015, saying that Iran is one of
several countries that should be brought into discussions to solve the Syrian crisis.75 Although the Saudis
may see an Iranian role as disadvantaging their own
role and interests in Syria, they may come to realize
that fighting proxy wars indefinitely is not in their
long-term interest, given that Iran and the Shia populations of the region are not going away. At the same
time, it is also not in Iran’s long-term interest to fight
proxy wars endlessly, as they are a potential drain on
resources and limits Iran’s influence only to the Shia
of the Arab world.
Hence, while the United States should avoid being
seen as an anti-Shia power, it should also avoid, as
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much as it can, the perception that it will soon become
an anti-Sunni power if bilateral U.S.-Iranian relations
improve. Instead, the United States should use its new
influence with Iran, albeit still limited, and its longstanding relations with Sunni countries like Saudi
Arabia to try to mitigate Sunni-Shia conflicts in the region, as such conflicts are a major source of instability
in the region today.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE U.S. ARMY
Within these two Arab groupings, there are opportunities and challenges—as well as subjects to avoid
—for the U.S. Army. Concerning the anti-Islamist alliance, particularly the alliance against violent Islamist
groups like ISIL, states in this alliance have a strong
need for effective counterterrorism assistance, because
ISIL has established branches in a number of these
countries. U.S. Army Special Forces, as was the case
in Yemen prior to the U.S. evacuation in 2015, are best
equipped to play this role not only in training these
regimes’ own special forces, but in cooperating with
them in counterterrorism operations if asked. Groups
like ISIL and al-Qaeda are a threat not only to the
Middle East but to other parts of the world, including
Europe and the United States. Thus, the U.S. Army,
in training indigenous forces, would help protect not
only U.S. allies but the U.S. homeland as well.
Because of political sensitivities, it may make more
sense to train friendly Arab states’ counterterrorism
forces in third countries or in the United States, away
from the spotlight of their own populations. Whole
units could be transported for an extended training
period and then brought back to their home countries
for operations. In addition, special courses should be
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established at professional military educational institutions for army officers from these countries on counterterrorism techniques and the lessons learned from
U.S. counterterrorism operations in Iraq. Such courses
should also have a strong human rights component
in order to impress upon these Arab military officers
the dangers of alienating civilians in counterterrorism operations. Without the cooperation of civilians
in areas of counterterrorist activity, it is very difficult
for governments to obtain the real-time intelligence
necessary to capture terrorists in their tracks.
In addition, U.S. Army officers should hold discussions with their counterparts in Arab coalition states
about the actual needs of their national armies. Often,
for reasons of prestige, many Arab armies want expensive military hardware to try to intimidate their
neighbors or to build up their militaries for a potential
conventional war. But the trends over the past decade
indicate that the greatest threats facing these Arab
states are terrorist insurgencies. Therefore, convincing their armies to rely more on military items suited
for counterterrorism operations, as opposed to “bigticket” hardware items that are ill-suited for present
needs, should be a high U.S. priority. U.S. Army officers, because of military-to-military relationships—
would be best positioned to carry out these discussions in a frank, respectful, and fruitful way.
In July 2015, the United States formally declared
Tunisia to be a non-NATO ally. In practice, this means
that Tunisia will be eligible for major U.S. defense
systems and equipment,76 providing opportunities
for U.S. Army personnel to train Tunisian army counterparts, particularly in counterterrorism operations.
Given the terrorist threat in Tunisia—including killings at two major tourist sites between March and
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June 2015 that left a total of 60 dead, Tunisia needs
as much help as possible to counter this threat, which
has the potential to derail its democratic progress.
At the same time, U.S. Army officers should avoid
being drawn into discussions with their counterparts
in the anti-Islamist alliance about groups like the Muslim Brotherhood or En-Nahda. As mentioned earlier,
the United States has not accepted Egypt’s designation
of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization,
and is supportive of the UN process that is trying to
bring Libyan factions—including the Libyan Muslim
Brotherhood—together in the form of a national unity
government. While En-Nahda remains a junior member of the governing coalition in Tunisia, some secularists (probably including some military officers) in
that country remain deeply suspicious of it. Although
U.S. Army officers might hear an earful of complaints
from their Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts about
the “dangers” posed by such Islamist groups, it would
be best to avoid this subject. When discussions about
Islamist organizations come up, U.S. Army officers
should try to steer the discussion to the more immediate and dangerous threats posed by ISIL affiiates like
the “Sinai Province,” which continues to stage terrorist operations in that area and in other parts of Egypt.
Similarly, in terms of the anti-Shia alliance, U.S.
Army officers should stay clear of discussions by Arab
Sunni officers about the Shia. First, derogatory terms
are sometimes used to describe the Shia (and vice versa for Shia officers describing Sunnis), and it would
be unseemly and unethical for U.S. Army officers to
participate in such discussions. After all, U.S. Army
officers would not want anyone to malign their own
religious beliefs. Second, participating in such discussions would also imply that the United States is tak-
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ing sides in a sectarian conflict, which it should avoid.
Third, as a practical matter, the United States has close
military ties to Shia-dominated armies as in Iraq, and
Sunni-dominated armies as in Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
and Egypt. So, logically, it would not make sense to
engage in such diatribes.
There are more legitimate ways U.S. Army officers
can reassure their Sunni Arab counterparts of the anxiety many of them feel about Iran and the proxy wars
that are part of this Shia-Sunni divide. These anxieties
have risen in the wake of the Iran nuclear deal of July
2015 because of the perception held by many Arab
Gulf countries that an economically stronger Iran will
be even more inclined to pursue mischief in the region.
U.S. Army officers can reinforce, to their host nation
army counterparts, the messages and pledges from
U.S. policymakers that the United States will continue
to remain their friend and support them militarily
against outside threats. To reinforce these assurances,
joint military exercises between U.S. Army officers
and their Sunni Arab military counterparts should
continue, and even be enhanced, to allay Sunni fears.
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